Assessment of the Viking Sky Incident

Assessment of the Viking Sky IncidentM a n ag i n g t h e i n c ide n t and the situation on the cruise ship. However, this was not viewed as having serious consequences for the management and outcome of the incident. JRCC-SN also recognize they did not completely reach out with information to the Police and health service at the reception center. Also, it took quite a long time for JRCC-SN to distribute their first situation report. JRCCSN's own assessment recommends that they evaluate measures to improve situation reporting to more actors, including the Police/RSC, the Health Authority, the fire and rescue services, to the County Governor, DSB, POD, CSU and FOH. Another example of inadequate communication is that Molde municipality had prepared for a large- scale disembarkation from Viking Sky when the ship was tied up at the town pier. This had been decided earlier in consultation between the municipality, the Police, and the shipping company. The municipality was not informed prior the arrival of the cruise ship that this decision had been changed, and that passengers could stay onboard if they wished. There are several reasons for the above-mentioned situations. The staffing at JRCC-SN required that they prioritize rescue management over less time- critical information sharing. Different actors had different communications platforms, and only a few had access to all relevant communications platforms; cf. a more detailed discussion under points 6.7.2 and 6.7.3. To improve communication between JRCC and the Police/RSC, the Police recommend having a liaison in JRCC, in addition to the Police representative in the rescue management at JRCC; cf., Chapter 6.2. However, JRCC-SN is skeptical of such an arrangement because in any event such a liaison must obtain information from a rescue controller. This means an extra link in the communication chain. Given that JRCC has sufficient capacity, in their view it would be easier to communicate directly with the Police/RSC. Therefore, dedicated communication and information sharing resources need to be provided at JRCC. These resources can also be used for other tasks that JRCC does not presently have the capacity to prioritize in the case of a rescue operation, for example, different staff and support functions, as well as representing an important complement to JRCC rescue work. Fortunately, circumstances meant that JRCC-SN was not late at the beginning of the incident: an extra rescue controller arrived at 1345 h., so by chance there were three rescue controllers and not two in the operations room when the Mayday came at 1400 h. It was also possible to reach more rescue controllers who were not on emergency preparedness watch. In addition, JRCC-SN's local management team were home and available. With all this, management of the situation got under way with all responsibilities covered. However, JRCC is vulnerable if obliged to rely on off-duty staff availability. Several people in JRCC-SN, including management, note the need to strengthen the operational level, in particular by establishing staff and support functions. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the Instructions to the Chief of Police for JRCC-SN 66 which states that two joint rescue coordination centers will, when necessary, assist each other's rescue operations. In particular, the Chief of Police shall ensure that they are prepared and ready for this. It must be added that Joint Rescue Coordination Center in North Norway assisted by relieving JRCC-SN of dealing with other rescue incidents going on at the same time as the Viking Sky incident. Therefore, the centers' capacity to assist each other in a major rescue operation can be limited. This factor must also be considered in light of the new Organizational Plan for the Rescue Service laid down in December 2019. 67 In our view JRCC should be able to improve communication and information sharing with central cooperating actors. Potentially, this can be achieved by re-prioritizing tasks and resources in JRCC, but could come at the expense of other important tasks. 66 Rescue Service – Instructions to the Chief of Police for the Joint Rescue Coordination Center, South Norway. Ministry of Justice and Public Security 2015. 67 FOR-2019-12-06 no. 1740: Organizational plan for the rescue service. 70 Assessment of the Viking Sky Incident / DSB REPORTside 2